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Logics of rational agency try to capture, in logic, various facets of human mental
state, and place normative relationships among them. One category of mental state in-
cludes informational attitudes, and notions such as beliefs and knowledge fall into this
category. In the past thirty years, logics of knowledge and beliefs have become an indus-
try, ranging from philosophy, to computer science and economics (cf. [2, 6, 8]). Other
mental states are motivational attitudes that capture something about the agents’ pref-
erence structure, and action attitudes that capture his inclination towards taking certain
actions. In a typical theory, the action attitudes mediate between the informational and
motivational attitudes; the agent’s choice of action is dictated by his wants and beliefs.
When studying these different attitudes in isolation, things are relatively easy. But
this becomes more involved when one considers the interaction between the various
types of attitude. For example, the dynamics of belief and preference are in general
intertwined, with changes in beliefs leading to change in preference (and possibly vice
versa). But more complex interactions are common. Suppose for instance that someone
has the goal to attend a conference, which was given rise to by the desire to publish. One
then may intend to take certain actions in service of this goal, such as writing a paper,
submitting a paper, booking a flight, reserving a hotel. These intentions are motivated
by the belief that the paper will be accepted at the conference, and they are inconsistent
with believing that there is no budget to travel. Each subsequent intention leads to an
increased level of commitment towards the goal to attend the conference.
This is a complicated picture, and so it’s not surprising that progress on this has
been relatively slow. In order to contribute to this, Shoham [10] recently proposed to
take an artifactual perspective on the notion of intention. When taking this perspective,
the focus is on a particular artifact (usually defined abstractly in mathematical terms),
whose behavior is completely specified and thus in principle understood, but for which
one seeks an intuitive high-level language to describe its behavior. A good example
is the use of the notion of “knowledge” to reason about distributed systems [6]. The
protocol governing the distributed system is well specified, but intuitively one tends to
speak about what one processor does or does not know about another processor, and the
role of the mathematical theory of knowledge is to formalize this reasoning. Shoham
uses the artifactual perspective on intentions by choosing as an artifact a database, and
he coins it the database perspective.
A database represents information in a specific format, and provides various ser-
vices associated with this information, the most basic services being storage and re-
trieval. Logic can provide the epistemological theory of the database, capturing the
semantics of the information stored in the database and of the operations on it. The
most well-known theory for a belief database is probably the Alchourro´n-Ga¨rdenfors-
Makinson (AGM) theory [1], which has been extremely influential in the area of belief
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change in both computer science and philosophy in the past few decades. Such an “in-
telligent” AGM belief database captures the beliefs of the agent, and, in addition to the
basic storage and retrieval operations, it ensures that the beliefs remain consistent at all
times while requiring a notion of minimal change.1
In order to model an intention database in the same spirit, consider the intention
database as being in service of some planner, in particular of the sort encountered in
so-called “classical” AI planning [15]. The planner posits a set of actions to be taken
at various times in the future, and updates this set as it continues with its delibera-
tions and as it learns new facts. In the philosophical parlance, these are “future-directed
intentions” (Figure 1). This framework is conceptually proposed by Shoham and sub-
sequently formalized by Icard et al. [7], who introduce a notion of coherence between
the belief database and the intention database: The belief database of an agent coheres
with the intention database when the agent considers it possible to carry out all of the
intentions. They then define AGM-like postulates for coherent belief and intention re-
vision.
Fig. 1. The database perspective
We can model our conference scenario using the database perspective by supposing
that the agent is planning to attend the conference (note that goals are explicitly modeled
in the database perspective, but they are assumed to be part of the planner). In the course
of planning, the agent will add intentions (which are understood as time-labeled actions)
to his intention database, such as “write a paper”, “submit the paper”, and, at some point,
“attend the conference”. These intentions will have to cohere with his beliefs: It would
be irrational for the agent to have the intention to visit the conference while he believes
there is no traveling budget. Therefore, if the paper has been accepted and the agent
finds out that there is no traveling budget, he will have to drop his intention to visit the
conference.
The focus of the current paper is to study the database perspective in a multi-agent
setting. Thus, returning to the example, suppose now there is a group researchers, each
with a belief database and an intention database, who are planning to go to conferences,
possibly by writing papers together. They have to coordinate their intentions in some
way, while they might not know all of the others’ beliefs and intentions. Moreover,
1 We are fully aware of the shortcomings of the AGM framework, in particular when it comes
to iterated revision. For now, we decide to stick to it for ease of exposition, but note that we
plan future work containing more sophisticated means of modeling belief dynamics.
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there may be dependencies between intentions of different researchers when they are
collaborating on a paper.
In order to tackle this problem, we propose to extend the database perspective with
a single auxiliary database in the multi-agent system that we coin the “Collective Inten-
tion Database”. The importance of collective intentions has been recognized for some
time (see, e.g. [4, 5, 11, 12] and many others). There is still much disagreement in the
philosophical literature about whether collective intentions can be reduced to more basic
intentions of the members of the group (cf. [3, 12, 13]), or whether collective intentions
are in some way irreducible (cf. [9, 14]). Once again, appealing to the database per-
spective allows us to sidestep these debates and center our study on what promises to
be most useful.
The collective intention database contains a set of collective intentions. A collective
intention is formalized as a set of action-agent pairs and a time point. In this way, the
collective intention database captures two basic notions. Firstly, it serves as a coordina-
tion mechanism for a set of agents by specifying what actions of the agents are carried
out simultaneously, and in this way represents dependencies between the intentions of
the individual agents. Secondly, it allows agents to reason about each others intentions,
in the sense that each agent believes that the other agents will carry out their part in
a collective intention. We extend the Icard et al. definition of coherence in a natural
way: An agent’s beliefs cohere with his intentions and the collective intentions if 1) the
agent considers it possible to carry out all of his intended actions (this is equivalent to
the Icard et al. definition), and 2) the agent considers it possible that all intentions by
other agents in collective intentions in which the agent itself also participates are carried
out by the corresponding agents. We use this notion of coherence to define AGM-like
revision postulates for beliefs, individual intentions, and collective intentions. Our main
result is a representation theorem, which states that we can equivalently represent the
revision postulates for the belief, individual intention, and collective intention databases
as revision operators on a semantic model for the multi-agent system.
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